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Po-co-co Balkans: Dancing Bears and Lovesick Donkeys, Bouncing Mines and Ethnic 
Conflict in Two Films from the Region 
Milena Marinkova 
 
Following the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the ensuing armed 
conflicts - all underpinned by violent and usually state-sanctioned ethnic nationalism - 
unleashed an unprecedented torrent of ‘moving’ images of the Balkans.1 The multinational 
nature of these enterprises has been accompanied by the somewhat unequal exposure of films 
produced by Balkan directors as compared to those produced by Western companies. 
Nevertheless, the two works to be discussed in this article, No Man’s Land (Danis Tanovi, 
2001) and Life Is a Miracle (Emir Kusturica, 2004), have enjoyed relatively wide exposure 
and a good selection of accolades.2 Both directors’ flirtation with the culture industries of the 
West3 has benefited their works by securing international audiences, which most local 
filmmakers and distribution companies could not afford to do, probably with the exception of 
access to regional or esoteric film festivals. Moreover, the fact that these films originate from 
the ‘inside’ of the conflict in the Balkans, and by extension present the insider’s perspective, 
lends the artefacts the added value of passionate authenticity over the detached impartiality of 
Western products. 
Nevertheless, the anticipated climax of the two films, both of them set in Bosnia in the 
1990s, appears to be deferred and non-committal: if not a mere backdrop - as is the case in 
Kusturica’s film - the Bosnian conflict is presented in broadly humanistic terms as a violent 
and irrational event, as Tanovi’s work suggests. Most reviews of Life Is a Miracle also tend 
to debunk it as a contemporary Romeo and Juliet romance, or as an absurdist mix of William 
Shakespeare and the Marx brothers.4 Whilst acknowledging Kusturica’s already recognisable 
cinematic style of excess and surrealism, critics are overly concerned with the absent or 
dubious ideological stance of the director.5 In comparison, the less controversial Danis 
  
Tanovi tackles the Bosnian war theme more directly by developing the central plot line 
around a trench story. Nevertheless, his film is replete with crude dark humour, reductive 
anti-Western sentiments and absurd situations in the director’s attempt to ‘treat a subject that 
was serious with a good sense of humour’.6 
One can then logically enquire about the validity of such treatment of a war, which has 
been uniformly denounced as the ugliest example of ethnic nationalism. The artistic flight into 
humour and parody can be interpreted as the aestheticisation of an event that demands 
unequivocal political commitment; moreover, the films’ challenge to armed conflict 
approximates a kind of a universalist discourse about good and evil, essential identities and 
ancient animosities. On the other hand, it is equally pertinent to insist on the political viability 
of postmodernist parody with respect to essentialist representations of the region and its 
populations.7 The refusal to ‘take sides’, which both films seem to advocate, then, becomes an 
attempt to be committed to those that are not aligned with and dangerously suspended in-
between the ‘opposing camps’. 
 
Whence the po-co-co? 
The above issues remind one of the perennial tensions between postcolonial critique and 
postmodernist aesthetics, ‘serious’ political commitment and historical analysis vs. playful 
irony and post-ideological cynicism. This, in its turn, calls for the deciphering of the first part 
of my playful title: po-co-co Balkans. That representations of the Balkans by those within and 
those without can be read against postcolonial critique of essentialist and universalist 
discourses is not hard to imagine. Historian Maria Todorova introduces the term ‘Balkanism’, 
arguing that similarly to Orientalism, Balkanism is a discourse about difference as defined 
against the European self. However, whilst Orientalism is a discourse about imputed 
differences between ‘types’ (self vs. other), Balkanism is a discourse about imputed 
differences within ‘one type’ (self vs. not-quite-self). In this sense, the Balkans are 
  
constructed in the European (read ‘Western’) imaginary not as the irreducibly different ‘other’, 
but as ‘an incomplete self,’ almost the same but not quite. This precarious hybridity of the 
region has competed against celebratory, but equally problematic, metaphors of the Balkans 
as the bridge between ‘East’ and ‘West’ and the meeting ground of three of the world’s major 
religions. She summarises: 
 
By being geographically inextricable from Europe, yet culturally constructed as ‘the other’ 
within, the Balkans have been able to absorb conveniently a number of externalized political, 
ideological, and cultural frustrations stemming from tensions and contradictions inherent to 
the regions and societies outside the Balkans. Balkanism became, in time, a convenient 
substitute for the emotional discharge that orientalism provided, exempting the West from 
charges of racism, colonialism, eurocentrism and Christian intolerance against Islam. After all, 
the Balkans are in Europe; they are white; they are predominantly Christian, and therefore the 
externalization of frustrations on them can circumvent the usual racial or religious bias 
allegations. As in the case of the Orient, the Balkans have served as a repository of negative 
characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the ‘European’ and 
the ‘West’ has been constructed. With the re-emergence of East and orientalism as 
independent semantic values, the Balkans are left in Europe’s thrall, anticivilization, alter ego, 
the dark side within.8 
 
Rather than simply replacing Said’s ‘Oriental’ with a Balkan other, Todorova suggests that 
Balkanist discourse has become the repository for Europe’s anxieties about its own self-
perception: steering clear of the compromised binary between European self and Oriental 
other, Balkanism sets up another, albeit paradoxical and more threatening, split. Within white, 
Christian and civilised Europe, there resides a not-so-white, not-so-Christian and not-so-
civilised not-quite-self. Contaminated by adjacent non-European political and cultural 
  
structures, this alter ego is similar but not quite, is within but not alike, is abject and yet 
appealing. Not only are the Balkans seen as the unfortunate source of international crises such 
as the First World War and disreputable regimes such as Nazism,9 but the deplorable political 
setup of this powder-keg of a peninsula is used as a recurrent metaphor for sectarianism, 
tribalism, barbarism and partisanship, as valid for Eastern Europe as for Africa, Asia or Latin 
America.10 
An identitarian Balkanist framework inevitably engages with stereotypes from within the 
Balkans themselves, premised on the kind of essentialism that Aijaz Ahmad, in a different 
context, has labelled ‘Orientalism-in-reverse’,11 and Gayatri Spivak condemned as 
‘ideologically contaminated by nativism or reverse ethnocentrism’.12 Such ethnocentric 
Balkanism-in-reverse often takes the form of anti-Western essentialism, which is premised on 
the same identitarian thought that has been demonising the Balkans since Ottoman times and 
caters to insalubrious nationalist sentiments. The Balkan self-designations within this 
framework embrace the supposed backwardness of this South-Eastern corner of Europe and 
attribute it to the pernicious presence of the ‘foreign’ empire of the Ottomans, whilst 
simultaneously celebrating the region as the discriminated cradle of ‘Western civilisation’. 
Thus, not only is the Balkanist binary not deconstructed, but it is being perpetuated and 
reinforced; and following the collapse of the communist regimes in the region, ‘Balkanism-in-
reverse’, bolstered up by extreme nationalist programmes, has been redefined as a viable 
political strategy for the dismantling of the corruptive legacy of state communism.  
Whilst a po-co (postcolonial) critique of representation of the Balkans à la Todorova is 
justifiable to an extent, it is important to distinguish between the postcolonial condition of 
regions affected by Western colonialism and the historical legacy of the Balkans. That there 
were colonial and imperialist stakes in the region is beyond doubt: the bridge between East 
and West, conveniently situated near the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, was a strategic point 
for exercising economic, political and military control. At the same time, however, the most 
  
prominent quasi-colonial presence in the region was that of a non-Christian (hence, not 
essentially European) Ottoman Empire, which penetrated the integrity of European Christian 
‘civilisation’.13 Within the European imagination, the tables were reversed and the non-
European ‘other’ has penetrated the European ‘self’. The main trajectory of Balkan othering 
proceeded along the religious trajectory - the region was not quite Christian, not quite Muslim. 
With the exception of Western philhellenism, the Christians of the Balkans were demonised 
by Balkanist discourse as a contaminated East-in-the-West,14 and even contemporary political 
theorists keep reinvigorating such problematic metaphors: Samuel Huntington, for instance, 
declares the need to ‘bound the West’ within the realms of Western Christianity, thus 
consigning the ‘fault line’ of Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam to the outside,15 and Julia Kristeva 
ascribes to the lands of Orthodoxy the unhealthy qualities of passivity, effeminacy, paganism 
and irrationality.16 Kaplan’s wonderfully embellished tale does not disappoint in this respect 
either: in his account, the Balkans transcend their status of an abject and volatile mixture of 
religious doctrines to become the tangible and infectious essence of the ‘Third World’, 
existing before the West ‘discovered’ them: 
 
The Balkans were the original Third World, long before the Western media coined the term. 
In this mountainous peninsula bordering the Middle East, newspaper correspondents filed the 
first twentieth-century accounts of mud-streaked refugee marches and produced the first 
books of gonzo journalism and travel writing, in an age when Asia and Africa were a bit too 
far afield … What does the earth look like in the places where people commit atrocities? Is 
there a bad smell, a genius loci, something about the landscape that might incriminate?17 
 
For all the similarities between Balkanist and Orientalist writing, it must be recognised that 
the Ottoman rule in the Balkans left a different social, economic and political legacy from that 
of European colonial empires elsewhere. One of the most frequently cited distinctions is that 
  
the Ottoman was a contiguous empire (similarly to the Habsburg and Romanov ones), whose 
territories were more integrated than those of the external, colonial structures of the British 
and French empires. Free peasantry and the lack of any indigenous aristocracies (apart from 
the Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldova, roughly coinciding with present-day 
Romania and Moldova) resulted in a strong sense of egalitarianism and a powerful state 
mechanism. Demographically speaking, the level of ethnic and religious homogenisation in 
the region was relatively low, which can be attributed to the ethnically more tolerant Ottoman 
authorities, the preservation of indigenous village structures, and the rotation (non-hereditary 
position) of resident Ottoman rulers and their armies.18 Whilst this level of relative local 
autonomy and state protection from the exploitation of local rulers facilitated the emergence 
of Balkan revolutionary movements and the spread of nationalist ideologies, it also led to a 
higher level of integration and cohesion between indigenous and imported structures. Thus, 
after the collapse of the European empires at the end of the First World War, and especially 
more so in the case of the Ottoman one, the newly independent nation-states inherited most of 
the socio-political set-up of the former imperial entity. In contrast, the dissolution of external 
colonial empires took place after the Second World War and the resulting independent states 
had to come to terms with the rupture in the political and cultural continuity that the colonial 
intervention had brought about.19 
Finally, another significant imperial presence in the region - that of the Russian Empire 
and later the Soviet Union - resulted in the addition of yet another layer to the mosaic of the 
Balkans and the vigour of Balkanism. Conceptualised by the European Enlightenment 
imagination as an ‘Other’, the Russian power state, with its pillars of Eastern Orthodoxy and 
authoritarian rule, became a threat in the eyes of Europe despite Russia’s self-institution as a 
protector of Balkan Christendom from the advent of Islam. Geopolitical struggles in the 
region, the collapse of European empires around the two world wars and the ‘construction’ of 
the Iron Curtain cemented the already existing quasi-Orientalist Balkanist discourse into what 
  
came to be known as Cold War rhetoric.20 Thus, Kaplan’s masculinist and Orientalist 
translation of the Balkans into a demonised communist landscape is seamless: 
 
Snow beat upon the window. Black ignite fumes rose from the brick and scrap-iron chimneys. 
The earth here had the harsh, exhausted face of a prostitute, cursing bitterly between coughs. 
The landscape of atrocities is easy to recognize: Communism had been the Great Preserver.21 
 
If previous metaphors sealed the region into ahistorical anarchy and irrationality, the 
picture of Eastern Europe emerging in the paragraph above is frozen in the grim mausoleum 
of ‘Western’ Cold War rhetoric. Even if with the collapse of state-supported communism the 
label ‘Eastern Europe’ has proliferated a cohort of geographically more specific and Euro-
centred locations - Central Europe (Mitteleuropa), the Baltic, South Eastern Europe - the 
leftover designation ‘Balkan’ has retained the ancient bias against the peninsula as primitive, 
violent and ethnocentric (and despite potential confusion with the Balkan wars of 1912 and 
1913, the conflicts following Yugoslavia’s dissolution were named ‘the Balkan war’). Samuel 
Huntington, on the other hand, prefers to attribute the fate of the Balkans to their unfortunate 
‘fault line’ location on the borders of different civilisations whilst simultaneously insisting on 
the essentially ethnic nature of political and ideological allegiance. 
 
In the post-Cold War world, multiple communal conflicts have superseded the single 
superpower conflict. When these communal conflicts involve groups from different 
civilizations, they tend to expand and to escalate. As the conflict becomes more intense, each 
side attempts to rally support from countries and groups belonging to its civilization.… The 
longer a fault line conflict continues the more kin countries are likely to become involved in 
supporting, constraining, and mediating roles. As a result of this ‘kin-country-syndrome’, 
  
fault line conflicts have a much higher potential for escalation than do intracivilizational 
conflicts and usually require intercivilizational cooperation to contain and end them.22 
 
Pronouncing the Cold War experiment of ideological ‘cross-civilisational’ alignment as 
unsuccessful, Huntington insists on the strength of ethnic kinship relations in determining a 
country’s or a region’s policy. All the more so in fault-line situations as the one in the Balkans, 
where a cluster of failed communist states of mixed ethnic populations became inevitably 
drawn into an escalating conflict aiming for civilisational purity. Whilst his argument 
purportedly relies on historical specificity, it smacks of rigid ethnic (and religious) 
identitarianism, devoid of any subtle cross-referencing with the current socio-economic, 
political, demographic and discursive situation. 
How do Kusturica and Tanovi tackle the Balkan theme in their works? As already 
mentioned, both films abound in staple Balkanist imagery centred round the ‘Balkan war’ of 
the 1990s. However, it is my contention that by invoking and actively using flagrant Balkanist 
discourse the two films destabilise it and point at its internal contradictions. Whilst the drive 
for internal demarcation, division, and exclusion underlying identitarian and nationalist 
thought has been ascribed a crucial role in the armed conflict in the multi-ethnic state of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and by extension to the Balkans, thus becoming a powerful metaphor in 
Balkanist discourse, the two films suggest that such a stance is highly equivocal. The stringent 
identitarianism pervading such conceptualisations is re-enacted in both films in a centrifugal 
move towards recharted ethnic and national belonging. Concomitantly, however, there is a 
centripetal move towards the personalisation of the conflict, which unfolds within more 
confined communities: in Kusturica’s case within a small town and in Tanovi’s between two 
soldiers. By transposing the battlefield onto the intimate space of personal relationships, No 
Man’s Land and Life Is a Miracle do not merely put a human face to an otherwise anonymous 
experience that some philosophers have classified as a mere media event. Arjun Appadurai 
  
observes that the violence inflicted within the immediate community arises from a feeling of 
betrayal committed by a friend, neighbour or acquaintance, to a large extent provoked by the 
revived identitarian politics of ethnic nationalism, which overrules prior communal 
affiliations: 
 
The rage that such betrayal seems to inspire can of course be extended to masses who may not 
have been intimates, and thus it can and does become increasingly mechanical and impersonal, 
but … it remains animated by a perceived violation of the sense of knowing who the Other 
was and of rage about who they really turn out to be. This sense of treachery, of betrayal, and 
thus of violated trust, rage, and hatred has everything to do with a world in which large-scale 
identities forcibly enter the local imagination and become dominant voice-overs in the traffic 
of ordinary lives.23 
 
In this sense, the macropolitics of the state, nationalist parties and the media not only 
commits violence on communities and individuals by imposing on them stringent parameters 
for ethnic and national identification and calling for unequivocal alignment ‘with one of the 
camps’, but also causes a paranoid rupture in the prior microscopic relations. This intrusion of 
the macropolitical into the personal and communal results in a re-charted ‘striated space’ (to 
use Deleuze and Guattari’s term),24 where ethnic and national identitarianism becomes 
prevalent.25 On the other hand, this striation imposed from without not only suggests that the 
disintegration of what some historians call a once successful multiethnic state has been driven 
by a complex of socio-economic and historical factors,26 but also undermines popular 
perceptions of the Balkan region as violent, irrational and chaotic. 
 
‘M-a-d-e in Europe’ – No Man’s Land and the agency of bodily entrapment 
  
Danis Tanovi’s No Man’s Land is an anti-war film permeated by the sense of absurdity. 
Trapped in a trench between the Serbian and Bosnian enemy lines, the so-called ‘no man’s 
land’, Nino (a Bosnian Serb) and iki (a Bosnian Muslim) have to resolve a dilemma: the 
body of a third soldier, iki’s friend Cera, has been placed on a bouncing mine which will 
explode if the body is removed. Faced by the impasse, the Serbian and Bosnian headquarters 
inform UNPROFOR. The latter, however, is far from effective. The result of media 
intervention is similar: keen on breaking the news, reporters (predominantly from the ‘West’) 
are after a newsworthy piece. And a war story they get: in line with the clichéd 
representations of conflicts as gory clashes and of Balkan peoples as ‘maniacs’, a shooting 
takes place which is successfully broadcast by all television crews on site. The story behind 
this instance of typical Balkan irrationality and ethnic hatred, however, turns out to be a story 
of personal betrayal: Nino’s eagerness to desert the two Bosnian soldiers threatens to disrupt 
the finely tuned power dynamic in the trench, thus he falls out with iki, and in the ensuing 
scuffle they kill each other. Allusions to the Yugoslavia break-up are more than obvious, and 
the ending is foreboding: after a German mine expert declares the impossibility of defusing a 
‘m-a-d-e in E.U.’ bouncing mine, UNPROFOR stages a fake rescue for the journalists’ sake 
whilst actually abandoning Cera’s body in the no longer exciting trench. 
The displacement of the conflict onto the intimate space of personal relationships surfaces 
from the very opening scenes of No Man’s Land. On the one hand, one can discern a certain 
disillusionment in the ironic treatment of externally imposed ethnic identities: Nino’s 
commander uses Cera’s body as a playful ruse to kill more Bosnians (who being Muslims will 
come to collect their dead after the day’s battle), just like Nino and iki swap roles in absurd 
cat-and-dog skirmishes about who started the war (the Serbs or the Bosnian Muslims). On the 
other hand, however, the fallibility of the soldiers’ allegedly firm ethnocentrism is 
demonstrated in Nino and iki’s inability to shoot each other even when at gunpoint and 
through the emphasis on their shared past: both have been in love with the Banja Luka beauty 
  
Sanja, and desperate to avoid the gunfire of the Serb and the Bosnian side they strip naked (of 
clothes as well as of other markers of identity) to wave the white banner of peace (made of 
their T-shirts). Nevertheless, the predicament of filiation is never out of sight, and although 
they apologise for being rude to each other the two men exhibit anxiety at the prospect of 
becoming friends:  
iki:  Sorry about earlier. 
Nino:  You were right. Why get acquainted to watch each other through sights? 
(44:28) 
This latent hostility erupts when Nino threatens to breach the fragile trench camaraderie by 
deserting the two Bosnians in order to save himself, culminating in the final shooting with no 
ultimate winner. 
But there is a survivor, albeit doomed. Cera has been the aural incapacitated witness to the 
mini-battles in the trench. Unable to keep coherent track of the eventful afternoon, Cera is 
torn between his fear of death and his responsibility for the lives of the other two soldiers. As 
a bitter commentary on the nature of war, his position is doubly undermined: by a mine 
produced in countries that have assumed the role of peace-keepers and by his limited control 
over the circumstances. Surrounded by the halo of impending demise, after surviving a fake 
death (unconsciousness), he awakens to find himself sentenced to death and turned into a 
death sentence for others. Cera has survived in order to witness and die without a witness, 
similarly to the fog-enveloped deaths of his squad mates at the opening of the film. This 
paradoxical position of a survivor cum death is counterpoised by the foregrounding of his 
physicality: in addition to the high-angle and bird’s-eye shots of his sprawled body, close-ups 
of his face and hands abound. Being an image of death has not after all divested the mine-
trapped soldier of his living corporeality: his body itches, his eyes cry and squint, his hands 
move. This reinforces the equalizing and suffocating impact of the situation: should anybody 
  
survive the mine, they would have to deal with the front lines of the two camps which 
surround this no man’s land limbo. Cera’s exclamation,  
Who cares who started [the war]? We’re all in the same shit now. Can I have a cigarette? 
(33:51), 
invokes the disposability of corporeality, especially to the outsiders who hygienically 
‘flush’ conflicts into the blind zone of their eyesight. The close-up on Cera’s quivering face 
after Nino and iki’s death, as well as the final zoom-out from his immobile and deserted 
body, intimates the despair of those trapped in the conflict. 
Cera’s incapacitated presence can be discussed in parallel with the highly inefficient 
Western observers: UNPROFOR and the media. The similarities, however, end here. The 
self-proclaimed defenders of the bodies in war conceive of Cera’s body as a portent of their 
own undoing, which therefore needs to be undone: for the UNPROFOR officials it will 
compromise their peace-keeping campaign and destroy their public image of deus ex machina, 
and for the mass media it is a convenient vehicle for ineffective criticism of the military 
which will boost their sales, but which needs to fit in their own political agenda. The 
disenchantment with such peacekeepers is highlighted by Nino and iki’s derogatory 
nickname for the UNPROFOR troops (the Smurfs) and silent disregard for the zealous British 
journalist Jane Livingstone. The watchdog role of mass media is repeatedly contested: Jane 
does corner colonel Soft into helping the three soldiers trapped in no man’s land by 
threatening him with bad publicity; however, her own incentive is to film a spectacle for 
Global News. Claiming to be a direct witness to the tragedy unfolding on the screen, the 
journalist tailors her testimony to the channel’s audience’s expectations. Thus, after Nino’s 
and iki’s death, her only question to the cameraman is: ‘Did you get it?’ (01:25:54), which is 
followed by a zoom-in on iki’s corpse from the cameraman’s point of view. Whilst Cera’s 
agency is severely circumscribed and cannot extend beyond placating belligerent Nino and 
iki, and choosing to lie still in order to prevent the death of others, the Western 
  
peacekeeping forces and media appear to be in greater control of their role in the conflict but 
choose to ‘stay still’ and thus cause the death of others. Although the idealistic French 
sergeant Marchand rebels against his British commander colonel Soft’s decision for non-
intervention and collaborates with the equally high-minded journalist Jane in exposing 
UNPROFOR’s passivity, they both become complicit in Cera’s objectification, turning him 
into a convenient tool for personal advancement. 
The condemnation of the ‘West’ in No Man’s Land is downplayed into a cliché by 
representing ‘Western’ individuals as equally trapped by corporate and institutional 
mechanisms as Cera is by the bouncing mine. Jane’s private conversation with sergeant 
Marchand is revealing in this respect:   
Jane:   Aren’t you neutral? 
Marchand: You can’t be neutral facing murder. Doing nothing to stop it is taking sides.  
Jane:   Magnificent. Will you say that on camera? 
Marchand:  I may be mad, but I am not stupid.  (57:44) 
The invocation of these ultimate equalisers, death and madness, as well as the unequivocal 
moral position on murder appears to blur the differences between the three soldiers trapped in 
No Man’s Land and the self-righteous Marchand and Livingstone (whose explorer namesake 
resonates with my earlier claim about the affinities between Orientalist and Balkanist 
discourses). The line between ‘taking sides’ by doing nothing (thus letting innocent people be 
killed) and ‘taking sides’ by intervening (thus potentially killing innocent people) is thin and 
as the film shows easy to criss-cross. Nonetheless, the identitarian principle has co-opted all 
sides to the conflict: the ethnic nationalism embraced by those in the trench is conducive to 
segregation, exclusion and annihilation, trumping and erasing any prior affiliations along 
class, gender or occupation lines. Those outside the trench, on the other hand, for all their 
appeal for inclusion and acceptance of difference hardly ever compromise with their own 
identity positions and perceived moral superiority. In this blend of broadly humanist ideas and 
  
rigid identity politics, one is left to wonder who takes and represents the side of those trapped 
in the war against their will. The film ends with a bird’s-eye zoom-out from Cera’s body, 
accompanied by a lullaby loving hummed by a motherly voice: ‘Sleep, dear son’. The camera 
eye leaves Cera, whose name, ironically, translates as ‘cure’. Is this departure as ethically 
questionable as the presence of the representatives of power?  Or does it metaphorically stand 
for the cure for the problems of an ethnically motivated conflict? Earlier Cera has complained 
that in addition to all the assaults on his body by enemy fire and mines, he has to endure being 
in the limelight, whilst no one is interested in his well-being. In a countermove to the media 
interest in him as a spectacle, the camera at the end of the film pulls back, leaving Cera 
spread-eagled on the mine and stripping him of the objectifying halo of a media-generated 
war image. 
 
‘It’s all in your head.’ – Life Is a Miracle and the possibilities of the absurd 
Life Is a Miracle is set in a small town in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, just before and during 
the conflict. The main plot revolves around the family of Luka Djuki, a Serbian railway 
engineer, obsessed with the reconstruction of the railway, which will (re-)connect Bosnia and 
Serbia, and boost local tourism and trade. His neurotic wife, Jadranka, is a former opera 
singer who is prone to jump into her Anna Karenina role any minute. Their son, Miloš , is a 
promising football player whose dream is to play for Partizan Belgrade. Their life of colourful 
excess and loud music, of violent football matches and corrupt politicians, is disrupted by the 
sudden arrival of the war. During a farewell party Jadranka runs away with a Hungarian 
musician, leaving Luka desperate and lonely. Miloš is drafted into the army and later taken 
hostage by the Bosnian side. A plan is hatched to exchange him for the captured Muslim 
nurse, Sabaha, whom Luka is assigned to take care of. Eventually, Luka and Sabaha fall in 
love and against all odds decide to run away together, ignoring the exchange agreement. 
However, different military fractions present obstacles to their plan and in the course of the 
  
escape Sabaha is wounded. Luka is forced to take her back to the military headquarters as 
they carry out the POW exchange. The film ends on a positive note: after Luka’s attempt to 
commit suicide, thwarted by the lovesick donkey Milica, he is magically reunited with Sabaha.      
Unlike No Man’s Land, Life Is a Miracle is hard to define as a war film, with the first half 
being saturated by music, alcohol and dance, raucous people and anthropomorphic animals, 
and the second being driven by the tragic love story of Luka and Sabaha. Nevertheless, the 
contextualisation of the conflict in the small community of Golubci on the Bosnia-Serbia 
border and the loud household of the Djukis allows for the exploration of shifting allegiances 
once the ethnic imperative steps in. The violent intrusion of the latter is signalled early in the 
plot by the mysterious onslaught of murderous bears fleeing the war in Croatia: 
Veljo:  The bears are slaughtering everyone. 
Luka:  But Tito shot the last one.  
Veljo:  They’re pouring in from Croatia! Beasts from Croatia. And you just sit here 
playing! 
Luka:  What beasts? 
Veljo: Bears. They’re like ours, only different. A bit bigger but with grey fur. 
Luka:  They must be Persian bears. 
Veljo:  Not Persian bears! They’re fleeing the war in Croatia. (7:27) 
Similarly to Kusturica’s critics, Veljo is resentful of Luka’s preoccupation with the 
celebrations of Liberation Day, in face of the impending bear attack. The metaphorical 
dimensions of this absurd scene suggest an implicit criticism of ethnically motivated conflict, 
but simultaneously with that acknowledge its infectious and pernicious nature. The scene that 
follows - a conversation between a gluttonous but honest (old school, communist) mayor and 
a new-party-line but corrupt (new school, mafia) politician - complicates the supposedly 
simple power dynamic in the conflict: it is not the ethnic affinity of Serbs, Croats and Bosnian 
  
Muslims that fuels the ongoing war but the interests behind freight trains of oil and cigarettes, 
the political structures that lobby for them, and the propaganda machine that is set in motion. 
The excruciating pressure exercised by macropolitically defined identity somewhat 
unexpectedly surfaces in the lecture that the Serbian captain Aleksi gives to Luka, who, 
distraught and desperate after his son’s capture, volunteers to be exchanged for Miloš : 
Aleksi:  Remember, this isn’t your private war. 
Luka:  I can’t take it any more. I’ll kill myself. 
Aleksi:  What? […] You’ll kill yourself? Too easy. Death doesn’t hurt, my friend. It’s 
living that hurts. Did you know I have a brother? Or I had one. I don’t know. My Stefan. It’s 
been two years. Two years since he disappeared. He’s not among the dead so I can’t bury him. 
He’s not among the prisoners. He’s not among the living so I can’t hug him. The man simply 
vanished! Vanished into thin air! I asked for a transfer to Lika. Know what they told me? This 
isn’t my private war. It’s someone’s war, my dear Luka. It’s a war for scum. Not yours or 
mine, for sure. (1:13:45)  
Once again the metaphor of individual helplessness in the face of war is mobilised, 
reminiscent of the no-win situation in the trench of No Man’s Land; war is presented as no 
one’s war in particular, yet a war that implicates everyone, without drawing clear-cut 
boundaries between guilty and innocent. Military men such as Aleksi in Life Is a Miracle 
and the three soldiers in No Man’s Land are presented as unwitting participants in an event 
beyond their control, as pawns in a game orchestrated from outside and whose allegiance to 
the ethnic principle is highly unstable. The bouncing mine from No Man’s Land is replaced 
by captivity in Life Is a Miracle, whereas non-committal peacekeepers and image-making 
media by corrupt and publicity-thirsty warmongers. If No Man’s Land brings to the limelight 
the debilitating situation of those trapped in war through the constant reminder of Cera’s 
exposed and vulnerable body, Life Is a Miracle does so through the figure of the vanished 
brother: neither dead, nor alive his presence is validated only by the absence of a confirmed 
  
death. Whilst filiation has successfully embroiled Aleksi and Luka in the conflict - the 
former hoping to find his brother and the latter his son - and whilst this resonates with ‘sons 
of the soil’ ideology, the illusory status of Aleksi’s brother undermines the unconditionality 
of the familial, and by extension ethnic, imperative, just like Luka and Sabaha’s affair and 
Miloš ’s friendship with the Muslim Eso affirm affinities that bypass ethnic and religious 
identitarianism. 
Absurdity and chaos transcend the human world to permeate the behaviour of an 
abnormally high number of anthropomorphic animals in this film: Croatian bears attack the 
small town, the lovesick donkey Milica saves Luka’s life, a cat kills pigeons through 
hypnotisation, a horse wants to play chess, a hawk brings about Hiroshima in the Djuki’s 
house. On one level it is possible to read the anthropomorphism as a denial of the ethnic strife 
and exoneration from responsibility for the ethnic war. And instances of such critique of 
essentialism are not that infrequent in Kusturica’s film: the impossible romance between Luka 
and Sabaha may be interpreted as affirming mutual tolerance and respect in a country that 
once epitomised the peaceful co-existence of different ethnic groups. But with the advent of 
populist nationalist discourse the tables are turned: Miloš’s traditional visit to Eso’s at 
Ramadan is interpreted by his mother as a danger. On a more collective level, revisionist 
history takes the upper hand and Serbs become ‘Chetniks’, Croats ‘Ustache’ (invoking 
respectively the ethnic cleansing carried out by the Serb royalist resistance and by the fascist 
regime in Croatia during the Second World War). The small town is literally torn apart by 
intolerance: a football match turns into an outright battle, whilst shooting bottles off the top of 
one’s head is just another form of teenage entertainment.  
One may be tempted at this point to accuse the director of over-spicing his production: the 
all too Balkan flavour of loud gypsy music (performed by the gypsy-techno band No Smoking 
where Kusturica himself plays), perpetual inebriety, exuberant dances, verbal and physical 
abuse, unhealthy superstition and paranoia, ubiquitous violence, explicit misogyny, corrupt 
  
politicians, rustic landscapes and human-like fauna – all are part of a Balkan exotic inventory 
thriving in the ‘Western’ popular imaginary. Similarly, and as a counterbalance to the 
frolicsome allusion to Balkanist stereotypes, Kusturica’s treatment of the ‘West’ - in 
particular its mass media - is close to crude lampoonery. The simplified news coverage 
reduces the conflict to the neat camps of aggressors, the Serbs, and freedom fighters, the 
Bosnian Muslims. As much as the idea of multiculturalism is widely promulgated by these 
same journalists, when it comes to identifying the stakeholders in the conflict the latter 
undergo ‘ethnic purification’ according to the ‘one nation-one state’ principle. Thus, towards 
the end of the film, when the Bosnian Serb Miloš is finally exchanged for the Bosnian 
Muslim Sabaha, an American journalist quickly ‘identifies’ Miloš as a representative of the 
typical Bosnian family who has been fighting against Serbian aggression. Consequently, the 
quest for a newsworthy story is not alien to her, much like Jane Livingstone in No Man’s 
Land: without even asking Miloš, she fills the gaps for him weaving an action movie plot 
about his imprisonment, torture and suffering. The comment on Western media coverage of 
the conflict is unequivocal: to the simplistic question directed at Miloš about his readiness to 
die for the freedom of Bosnia, the football star-turned-soldier burps and tosses the mike. Not 
only has he been addressed in a language he does not understand, which technically prevents 
him from speaking back, but Miloš has already been ascribed an ethnic identity by the 
impudent journalist - an identity that is as essentialist as those advocated by ethnocentric 
nationalists and whose hold over people’s minds is multiplied by media dissemination. 
Unable to engage with the space pre-determined for him, the ‘typical’ representative responds 
in a ‘typically’ crude way. 
*** 
Luka:  Try to be smart your whole life and in the end you can’t prove anything. It’s all 
theory. 
Aleksi: After Hiroshima, there’s no more theory. 
  
Jadranka: My dear captain, Hiroshima is in our house! 
Luka:  It’s all in your head. It’s got nothing to do with Hiroshima. (2:19:00) 
This final exchange at the failed reunion of the characters of Kusturica’s film takes place 
outside the destroyed house of the Djukis, in the aftermath of a hawk killing chickens or 
perhaps a cat pouncing on pigeons. Absurd, fragmented and intertextual, the scene smacks of 
a typical postmodernist ploy to invoke the uncertainty of the times, the incoherence of 
experience. Life becomes just another theory, Hiroshima enters a Bosnian household, and 
then everything is dissipated into the ether of abstraction. The reference to Theodor Adorno’s 
dictum about the impossibility of poetry after Auschwitz recalls the scope of ethnically driven 
destruction, emphasises the power of discursive formations and questions the political 
motivation of cultural products. The invocation of Hiroshima brings forth the issues of what 
constitutes a justifiable military intervention, of who is responsible for the consequences and 
how the prioritisation of conflict resolution is carried out. In a similar fashion, the two films 
discussed in this article question the representation of war by exploring the complexity of 
‘taking sides’ and challenging the superficiality of finger-pointing. Denouncing the reduction 
of the conflict to ‘a theory’ about ethnic, racial or religious groups, these works focus on the 
concrete and material – exemplified by Djukis’ family and Cera’s body – and claim that 
historical, social, economic and political factors need to be considered in the representation of 
a war zone. Condemning the universalism and essentialism of Orientalism and Balkanism, 
frequently employed by contemporary culture industries (and mass media in particular), No 
Man’s Land and Life Is a Miracle recognise the power of identitarianism and the inevitable 
complicity of artistic representations in such discursive practices. Nonetheless, each of them 
attempts to forge its own sympathetic way of conveying that which others have decided to 
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